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Conclusions / overview 
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) should be rejected.  
The evidence for there being a significant problem in counterfeit trademarks or unauthorised 
copies is weak. The OECD estimates that less than 2% of global trade is affected. In Australia 
only 0.01% of imports are seized counterfeit goods.  
Some of our major trading parties strongly object to these matters being handled outside the 
normal forums (the WTO and WIPO).  
ACTA is very poorly drafted, with a wide range of expansionary, ambit and unclear terms. 
Despite the objective being to deal with counterfeit trademarks and unauthorised copyright 
use, the treaty constantly refers to “intellectual property”. Further there is frequent use of the 
expansionary term “at least”. The treaty also uses inappropriate language, adopting the 
pejorative term “pirate” instead of the more appropriate “unauthorised”. At a minimum the 
treaty needs to be redrafted to use clear, precise and unloaded language. 
A wide range of remedies are already available (the NIA says nothing will change in 
Australia as a result of this treaty). ACTA proposes even further “remedies” including 
potential destruction of property owned by third parties, who may be entirely ignorant of the 
use of the property to produce infringing goods. At least one of these proposed forms of 
compensation is economic nonsense. There is no evidence in the NIA or in the OECD study 
on which the NIA draws that full consideration has been given to the very different nature of 
the various markets involved. Without such an understanding remedies can easily be 
disproportionate. 
Innocent parties may be affected by ACTA. At one “consultation” representatives of shippers 
and freight forwarders raised significant and legitimate concerns about additional costs that 
would be imposed on them. A full cost benefit analysis is needed identifying all the parties 
affected, whether they will benefit or lose, and whether they are domestic or overseas parties. 
Full consideration should also be given to consumer interests.  
These factors add to a bottom line where there is no clear and significant net economic gain 
to Australia. Indeed the ACTA treaty appears to be a sledgehammer in search of a very small 
nut. It does not meet basic drafting standards. ACTA therefore contravenes the principles of 
the current government’s trade policy.1  
                                                 
1
 Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement, April 2011, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.pdf 
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1. Introduction 
This submission takes an economic policy perspective to assessing ACTA. It is assumed that 
the objective of any trade treaty is to maximise Australian economic well-being. 
I begin by assessing the evidence on the extent of the alleged problem of counterfeit 
trademarks and unauthorised use of copyright (Section 2.1). When considering possible 
remedies to infringement of trademarks, patents or any other legislated monopoly privilege it 
is also important to understand the nature of the markets and the extent to which they are 
competitive. Markets for counterfeit trademarks and unauthorised copies are quite different 
(see Section 2.2).  
The submission then considers whether the proposals in ACTA are proportionate to what the 
data suggest is a rather small problem (of the order of 2% of world trade and a mere 0.01% of 
Australian consumer goods imports for traded physical counterfeits). Concerns raised are the 
expansionary language (“intellectual property”, “at least”), the wide range of remedies 
available to “rights-holders”, the economic nonsense of at least one of the proposed remedies. 
There are also issues about the apparently unlimited scope of ACTA (commercial scale is not 
defined). Questions are also raised as to whether it is appropriate to use public resources to 
enforce private commercial privileges (Section 3).  
The submission ends by looking briefly at three disparate issues. Firstly it asks why Australia 
would want to agree to yet another multilateral treaty on “intellectual property” given the 
Productivity Commission’s (PC) comments on this issue and the Government’s positive 
response to the Commission’s recommendations (Section 4.1). It then addresses one major 
issue raised by the constant use of the term “intellectual property” in what should have been 
drafted as a treaty on trademarks and copyright. This issue is “counterfeit” patented goods 
(Section 4.2). Thirdly some issues related to innocent third parties, primarily shippers and 
freight forwarders are raised (Section 4.3). 
There are two short appendices, the first considers some more detailed issues in measuring 
the counterfeit goods markets and presents further data from the OECD report and from the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). The second discusses what appears 
to be a substantial “pro-intellectual property” bias in Australia’s trade negotiations despite the 
substantial evidence that this is not in Australia’s interests.  
2. What is the extent of the problem? 
It is not possible to comment sensibly on ACTA without first reviewing the extent of the 
alleged problem with respect to counterfeit trademarks and unauthorised use of copyright. In 
the next section the evidence on the size of the alleged problem is reviewed. An equally 
important issue in assessing ACTA is the nature of the quite different markets in various 
forms of unauthorised use of products which claim “intellectual property” monopolies. These 
markets differ considerably depending on whether it is a trademark, a copyright or a patent 
which is being claimed by the “rights-holder” alleging infringement. It is essential to 
understand these different markets if one is to properly assess whether the extensive 
“remedies” proposed in ACTA are proportionate and this matter is discussed in Section 1.2.  
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2.1 Evidence presented by DFAT 
The National Interest Analysis (NIA)2 cites a major OECD study as indicating that 
international trade in “counterfeit and pirated [sic] materials” is growing and that the global 
value of this in 2007 was A$ 250 billion. This is not actually correct: the OECD update states 
that: 
“counterfeit and pirated goods in international trade grew steadily over the period 2000 
– 2007 and could amount to up to USD 250 billion in 2007… The share of counterfeit 
and pirated [sic] goods in world trade is also estimated to have increased from 1.85% in 
2000 to 1.95% in 2007.”  
(OECD 2009: 1, emphasis added) 
During the period 2000 to 2007 world trade more than doubled. The OECD estimates a 
maximum of less than 2% of world trade being counterfeit goods are based on a survey of 70 
out of 169 customs organisations which provided estimates of seized counterfeit goods for 
any part of the seven-year period 1999-2005. These estimates were used to generate 
proportions of exported goods which are counterfeit, and to estimate the proportion of traded 
goods of different types which are counterfeit. This generates a product-country propensity 
for counterfeit goods which can then be applied to international trade statistics. Any change 
in estimated counterfeit goods is therefore entirely attributable to increased volumes and 
values of international trade in particular product lines and from particular countries and not 
to any changed propensity for counterfeit goods. The growth in the proportion of 
international trade estimated to be counterfeit goods is therefore due to above average growth 
in trade in the types of goods and/or exports from countries most likely to generate 
counterfeit goods. In presenting its 2007 update the OECD advises that “[f]urther 
assessments of the share of counterfeiting and piracy in international trade would therefore 
require a new detailed assessment of customs data on seizures” (OECD 2009: 2).  
In respect of counterfeit goods in Australia, the OECD report shows that the range of 
counterfeit products has not changed over the past five years (OECD 2008: 70). The NIA 
advises that seized alleged counterfeit products were A$26m in 2009-10. They do not put this 
figure in context. In 2009-10 the value of merchandise imports was A$258,655m (or 
A$205,217m for imports of consumption goods). Using either of these measures as a base 
seized alleged counterfeit products are only 0.01% of Australian imports.3  
These figures refer to trade in physical products. The OECD has done a separate study on 
unauthorised copies of digital material, but this has no estimates of the volume or value of 
this trade. For the US economy, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicates that, 
in the absence of reliable data, most estimates are based on assumptions (see Appendix 1). 
Industry sources, using very questionable assumptions, estimate substantial losses (e.g. 20% 
for software). The few available academic studies show that losses are much more modest 
(e.g. less than 6% for music). Indeed one study of music downloading showed that this 
increased consumer welfare, releasing income for expenditure on other goods and services 
(Rob and Waldfogel 2006). The GAO cites one expert as considering that the main impact of 
                                                 
2
 The NIA does not give an author. From the content I have assumed it was prepared by DFAT. The DFAT 
website on ACTA refers to the NIA but does not disclose its authorship (http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/).  
3
 The $26 m alleged counterfeit goods seized is from para 10 of the NIA. The value of merchandise imports 
during 2009-10 was calculated from ABS 5368.0 - International Trade in Goods and Services, Australia, Nov 
2011, using the download facility to obtain a time series for total goods imports. Total goods imports for 2009-
10 were $258,655m. If only consumption goods are included the value was $205, 217 but the proportion of 
alleged counterfeit goods seized remains constant at 0.01%. 
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counterfeiting is a redistribution of income not any overall economic loss to the nation (GAO 
2010: 28).  
From a national interest viewpoint the available research suggests the “problem” is rather 
small and may well involve redistribution from “rights-holders” to consumers rather than any 
net economic loss. For Australia “problem” appears insignificant.  
2.2 The markets for counterfeits:   trademarks and copyright 
The OECD study does not adequately separate the specific legal monopoly privileges which 
are being undermined through counterfeit and unauthorised use. This limits the capacity to 
assess fully the extent of any problem and determine proportionate responses. The nature of 
the issues involved is quite different for counterfeit goods and for unauthorised use of 
copyright. It is also very different for any parallel problems for other forms of “intellectual 
property” (discussed in Section 4.2 below).  
This is why it is dangerous to use the term “intellectual property”. The term “intellectual 
property” actively impedes rigorous consideration in the issues involved in the infringement 
of patent and copyright monopolies and trademark registration as each is a quite distinct 
economic policy with different characteristics and objectives. A major problem with ACTA 
is the constant use of the term “intellectual property” rather than more specific language. As 
the purpose of ACTA is to address issues in trademark counterfeits and unauthorised use of 
copyright it should have been drafted in precisely these terms. It would then be tighter, 
clearer, easier to assess and less potentially dangerous to Australian economic interests.  
Counterfeit goods generally refers to use of a trademark without authorisation for goods in 
the same line of economic activity as that for which the trademark is registered. As the 
OECD study identifies there are two markets for counterfeit goods. There is a primary market 
with high quality close copies where the consumer purchases the product for the normal price 
believing it to be authentic. This market is quite limited in terms of volume and tends to focus 
on very high priced goods. Quite different from this is the secondary market where 
consumers are well aware that they are purchasing a copy. The secondary market is very 
price sensitive and there is good reason to believe most consumers in this market would not 
purchase authentic goods as they are beyond their economic reach. Unlike the primary market 
the secondary market can have considerable volume: indeed it can exceed the size of the 
primary market (OECD 2008: 48). Data for the US economy suggest that the most substantial 
proportion of seized counterfeit goods relates to trademark infringement.4 
Unauthorised copies (referred to throughout the treaty as “pirated copyright products”) are 
copies that infringe copyright, i.e. are made without authorisation.  
I do not use the term “pirate” as I consider this indicative of the political agenda of 
beneficiaries of copyright monopolies. There is evidence that “piracy” – to the extent it 
exists – flows both ways, with publishers and distributors encrypting material to 
eliminate fair use of goods, using regional coding so that travellers find that products 
useless when they get home, and locking (stealing) e-books after purchase should the 
buyer move countries. Thus throughout this submission I use the less pejorative term 
“unauthorised copies”. Such dispassionate language would be more appropriate for an 
international treaty and for any reputable study.  
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 For 2004-08 58% of reported seized counterfeit goods were classified as footwear, wearing apparel or 
handbags/wallets/backpacks (GAO, 2010: 7).  
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In regard to unauthorised copies there is less evidence here that there is a primary and 
secondary market. Apart from works of art, it is difficult to imagine what parts of any 
markets for the unauthorised use of copyright could be primary markets. As indicated above 
with respect to counterfeit goods, secondary markets rarely compete with primary markets. 
There is little evidence that consumers in such secondary markets would purchase other than 
very occasionally in the authorised market. Further there is reason to believe that use of 
unauthorised copies can operate to the advantage of sellers of copyrighted material. Such 
shifting from trial in secondary markets to occasional purchase in authorised markets is likely 
with software, music and books.5  
In considering appropriate and proportionate responses to unauthorised use of copyright 
materials the lack of genuine competition between secondary markets and authorised markets 
is a very important characteristic. In particular this distinction should inform determination of 
any penalties for infringement.  
There are also very substantial differences in the characteristics of markets for physical 
products and markets for digital products. Much copyrighted material – particularly where 
unauthorised use is likely (music, software, movies) – is today generally available in digital 
form. There are many methods of protecting digitised material and the distributors of 
copyrighted movies and music have been successful in lobbying to achieve legislation to 
make it illegal to un-encrypt such material. In the case of e-books the distributors readily 
accept the global provisions of copyright, but then distribute material only on a country-by-
country basis and steal back the goods they have sold by removing access to them should the 
innocent purchaser move countries.6 
Most unauthorised use of copyrighted digital material is in the secondary market with prices 
considerably below those in the authorised market. Industry estimates assume a 1-for-1 
substitution rate between the authorised and secondary markets which is clearly wrong. The 
GAO advises a range of potential positive outcomes for digital copyright holders from 
unauthorised use including increased brand awareness and shifting between secondary and 
authorised markets as learning effects increase (GAO 2010: 14-15). 
It is difficult to be overly sympathetic to claims for further government assistance to 
“protect” the distributors of digitised copyright material from competitors where distributors 
not only take advantage of the copyright system but also use a range of additional 
“protections” which undermine copyright’s balance between consumer and distributor 
interests. If these parties wish to take advantage of the global provisions for copyright and 
call on government resources to back up their enforcement efforts, then they should cease 
using encryption and back repeal of laws making it illegal to seek access to encrypted 
material. Alternatively where producers use encryption they should not be provided with 
access to the copyright system, and in particular they should not have free access to 
government resources to enforce their business model.7 It is unfair to consumers for these 
distributors to have their cake and eat it too. 
The constant references in the treaty to “copyright and related rights” presumably derive from 
the relevant section in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights treaty 
                                                 
5
 I have myself have purchased a book available as an open access download, because the initial access 
persuaded me that its value was such that a hard copy for regular reference would be useful. 
6
 Private correspondence with amazon.com. This information is not routinely provided to potential purchasers of 
Kindles.  
7
 As far as I am aware the principle of user pays has not yet been applied to recoup the resources expended by 
Australian taxpayers on enforcing private trademarks and copyright monopolies. Such an initiative might 
perhaps make a small contribution to meeting Australia’s budget challenges.  
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(TRIPS). TRIPS does not however spell out what these “related rights” are. Nor does ACTA. 
The phrase “and related rights” is undefined and should be removed from ACTA.  
3. Is ACTA proportionate? 
As indicated above the extent of the problem seems insignificant, and there is no independent 
evidence that it is growing other than as a consequence of growth in authorised markets. 
Further there is no sound separation of evidence in respect of trademark counterfeit compared 
to unauthorised copyright use. 
Against this background it is difficult to accept that the proposed range of measures is 
proportionate to the alleged problem. ACTA calls for the use of even more public resources 
to enforce private privileges designed to encourage creativity. Most creators find it 
impossible to distribute their creations without handing over their copyright in perpetuity to 
distributors. Distributors, for example academic publishers, make very substantial returns 
from these legislated privileges. Publishers of academic journals have profit levels that 
economists define as “excess profits” indicating a very substantial return from their copyright 
monopolies. In 2009 Elsevier’s profit rate was 35% and Reed Elsevier’s was 25%.8 There 
seems no sound reason why “rights-holders” cannot use their own resources to take legal 
action in any instance of unauthorised use. 
There are also reasons to be concerned at the use of criminal sanctions particularly in respect 
of infringement of copyright. The economic policy of copyright is designed to encourage 
creativity. It does this by providing the opportunity of a monopoly return to the creator. It 
restricts what I may do with my own purchased property if the distributor claims copyright 
privileges.9 If the creator’s profits are potentially decreased through infringing activity civil 
remedies, including compensation, are available. Unauthorised use of a legislated power to 
exclude others from a market is not theft in the way that taking physical property is theft. If 
my car is stolen I cannot use it. But if one of my publications is used without authorisation 
nothing is removed from me, particularly if the unauthorised user cannot afford to purchase 
an authorised copy. The shift from civil to criminal law was an accident of history, taking 
place in the USA in 1902 following the extension of copyright to the sheet music industry 
(Boldrin and Levine 2008: 32). At this time, of course, the USA refused to provide full 
copyright privileges to foreign authors in order to protect their publishing industry. Criminal 
sanctions for copyright infringement have spread to other countries without any assessment 
of its impact or proportionality.   
ACTA aims to increase the likelihood that holders of copyright privileges, including foreign 
companies, are able to apply both civil and criminal penalties for commercial scale 
infringement. ACTA requires criminal penalties for commercial scale infringement, but does 
not properly define this. It reads: 
“… acts carried out on a commercial scale include at least those carried out as 
commercial activities for direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage”. 
ACTA, Article 23(1) 
This definition effectively defines commercial as being any activity that provides economic 
advantage, with no mention of what constitutes scale. If I purchase one unauthorised copy on 
a secondary market I receive an economic advantage from this and Article 23 as drafted 
effectively defines this as “commercial scale”. Indeed Article 14(1) specifically includes 
                                                 
8
 Morrison, 2010. Monbiot (2011) reports Elsevier’s profits to have been 36% in both 1998 and 2010.  
9
 Boldrin and Levine, 2008, claim this is the real theft in the intellectual property system. 
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small consignments in ACTA’s ambit. This is another instance of very poor drafting with 
major implications for the scope of ACTA.   
Because the extent of “the problem” has not been properly presented, a full assessment of 
proportionality is not possible. One notes that the treaty includes frequent use of the phrase 
“at least …” suggesting an expansive future. As with the use of the term “intellectual 
property” this opens the door to wider than intended interpretation, and concomitant dispute.  
Proposed remedies are multiple and seem very open-ended and thus potentially 
disproportionate. Examples include “any legitimate measure of value the right holder 
submits” (Article 9(1)); “additional damages” (Article 9(3)(c)); and presumptions for 
determining damages (Article 9(3)(b)). The footnote on this last point provides for damages 
based on the quantity sold on counterfeit markets “multiplied by the amount of profit per unit 
of goods which would have been sold by the right holder if there had not been an act of 
infringement…” (footnote 3, page 7). This is economic nonsense. It is virtually impossible to 
determine the quantity in the authorised market which might have been sold in the absence of 
a secondary counterfeit market – the evidence suggests a mere fraction, and there are no 
sound principles for estimating this fraction in any market. The profit margin in secondary 
markets is considerably lower than the profit margin in authorised markets. The appropriate 
presumption would be the quantity sold in the secondary market multiplied by the profit 
margin in the secondary market which is equal to the profit made from the infringing activity.  
The multiple options for providing copyright or trademark holders with compensation when 
infringing activity takes place do not look proportionate to the nature of any associated harm. 
In the case of copyright the “rights-holder” is provided by the government with a means of 
charging high prices to ensure recovery of their investment. In some cases distributors make a 
substantial profit, in other cases profits can be small. But where the infringement is entirely in 
the secondary market any concomitant loss to the distributor may be very small. The 
appropriate recompense in most cases would seem to be the net profits earned from the 
infringing activity. The actual penalty to the infringer will be greater than this as they will 
also have wasted all their time and effort.  
In the case of counterfeit trademarks, the traditional remedy has been a court order to remove 
the infringing trademark. For both primary and secondary counterfeit markets there is a case 
for compensation to take the form of the net profit made by the infringing party. Again this 
will act as a significant deterrent given the consequent loss of time and resources.  
The proposals that equipment used to produce counterfeit or unauthorised products be 
destroyed do not seem to be limited to knowing use. Without such a limitation such measures 
seem disproportionate.  
ACTA also includes compensation to those innocently charged with counterfeit or 
unauthorised use. Procedures for ensuring this are required “…not [to] unreasonably deter 
recourse to these procedures” (Article 18). They should however be sufficiently strong to 
fully compensate any innocent parties whose business in disrupted by unfounded allegations 
of infringement.  
4. Some other considerations 
4.1 Why go it alone? 
As the Productivity Commission noted there are sound economic reasons for preferring 
multi-lateral trade treaties to bilateral or regional treaties. However, as Drahos has shown, the 
USA has driven an active agenda of bilaterals and multilaterals as forum shifting allows it 
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greater success in achieving an agenda which preferences US business interests (Drahos 
2001). The appropriate forums for dealing with the enforcement of agreed “intellectual 
property” provisions in trade treaties are the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and Interpol. All have active programs addressing 
this issue. Further the World Health Organisation (WHO) has an active program addressing 
the issue of counterfeit medicines (OECD 2008: 185). 
Nonetheless the USA has been dissatisfied with progress in achieving the goals of its major 
corporations in these forums so has pushed forward with ACTA. It is unclear why it has been 
in Australia’s interests to participate in this activity. 
Because of the most-favoured nation provisions of TRIPS any “intellectual property” matters 
agreed in a bilateral or multilateral treaty confer identical benefits on all signatories to 
TRIPS. This is a poor use of negotiating powers – to negotiate benefits from a small sub-set 
of nations in exchange for providing benefits to all. This may be less of a problem with 
ACTA than with the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) as the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) alleges ACTA changes nothing. Which of course begs the 
question of why they have put so much effort into it (see Appendix 2).  
The treaty draft suggests that 37 parties participated in the negotiations. Evidence suggests 
that it was only 11 parties, with the EU representing its 27 members. There is no evidence of 
any thorough consideration of these issues within each member nation of the EU. One notes 
that the Mexican Congress has opposed the treaty although Mexico was a party to the 
negotiations.10 It seems probable that the major influences on the treaty have been business 
interests acting through the US, EU and Japanese negotiators. These business interests would 
have been dominated by very large companies owning a significant amount of legislated 
copyright and patent monopolies and registered trademarks. Some of the odd footnotes in the 
text, indicating that despite the ambit claim to cover “intellectual property” patents are not 
covered by particular sections appear to be last minute amendments designed to achieve 
wider agreement.  
While the treaty participants include countries important to Australia’s trade interests, 
Australia has other major trading partners which have actively stood aside from the ACTA 
negotiations and who are highly critical of it. Examples of critical comment on the ACTA 
have come from at least India and China.11 One has to ask why Australia wishes to offend 
these other trading partners. Especially if, as implied by the NIA, ACTA merely repeats 
existing standards.  
4.2 Patents 
The NIA indicates that the primary purpose of this treaty is to reduce “international trade in 
… counterfeit trade mark and pirated [sic] copyright products.” (para 5). Quite what any 
secondary purpose is is unclear.  
Despite this objective the treaty abounds with the expansionary term “intellectual property” 
as defined by Part II of TRIPS.12 There are frequent references in the treaty to “at least”, also 
                                                 
10
 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 15:24, 29 June 2011, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/109704/ 
11
 See http://keionline.org/node/1300 and http://keionline.org/node/883 respectively. 
12
 The proposed treaty defines the catch-all term “intellectual property” in terms of the knowledge monopoly 
privileges set out in TRIPS Part II. These are patents, copyright, trademarks, industrial designs, circuit layout 
designs, computer programs, compilations of data, cinematographic works, performers and sound recordings 
and broadcasts. The TRIPS section on copyright is headed “copyright and related rights” though nowhere in the 
section are these unspecified “related rights” defined. 
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suggesting an expansionary intent. While patents are specifically excluded in some footnotes, 
the treaty should be redrafted to refer only to copyright and trademarks.  
Patents have completely different characteristics to copyright and differ again from 
trademarks. While their term is theoretically more limited, the nature of the monopoly right 
provided is far stronger – it includes the right to prevent use and sale of independent 
inventions. This is possibly the first ever treaty proposing to include legislated privileges 
other than copyright and trademarks in a system of border enforcement measures. This is not 
noted in the NIA.  
A key concern for Australian producers and consumers would be the possible use of the term 
“intellectual property” to extend ACTA to the patent system, particularly patented 
pharmaceutical products. Brief consideration is given to this matter here.  
The OECD report considers the issue of “counterfeit” patented products. Setting aside 
problems in defining what is a counterfeit patented product given that most patent 
infringement involves inadvertent trespass (Bessen and Meurer 2008) and that the 
determination of whether a patent has been infringed is a complex technical matter, the 
OECD notes that patented products would be unlikely targets for infringers given the 
complex equipment needed to produce highly technical and complex products (OECD 2008: 
49). The OECD notes that counterfeiting patented products may not involve production but 
rather re-labelling.  
The issues involved in “counterfeit” patented products include: 
(i)  whether infringement has occurred (hard to determine as patent specifications do not 
set clear boundaries to what is claimed);  
(ii)  whether the patent is valid; and  
(iii)  for some product types whether there are product quality concerns.  
It would be a major policy change for Australia to introduce the measures proposed in this 
treaty with respect to patents. Australia also has good systems for ensuring that marketed 
products meet health and safety requirements. This is particularly so with respect to 
pharmaceuticals where the Therapeutic Goods Authority (TGA) must approve manufacturing 
standards. From a consumer viewpoint the paramount issue with unauthorised 
pharmaceuticals is quality, and it would be dangerous to prejudice this potentially life and 
death issue by removing clear and full control from the TGA.  
4.3 Innocent third parties 
From a civil society perspective the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was 
negotiated in considerable secrecy. Why this should be so is unclear and DFAT officials gave 
no clear answer to questions on this matter in the one “consultation” I attended. 
During that “consultation” representatives of shippers and freight forwarders made a number 
of very telling points in regard to the significant negative impact that the proposed treaty 
would have on their operations. It is surprising that the NIA does not mention these concerns 
nor how they have been addressed. Shippers and shipping agents are a vital lubricants in 
international trade and it is essential that ambit claims from monopoly “rights-holders” not 
impede genuine trade in real goods and services.13 The fact that the agreement might not 
require new legislation does not mean it will not lead to changes in operational policies that 
will impact on such parties.  
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 As opposed to legislatively created intangibles.  
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The NIA suggests there was a genuine round of consultations. Consultation is a word 
implying at least some element of a two-way process. I attended a single consultation and it 
was far from this. It was a chorus of disparate voices raising a wide range of issues and 
concerns both for and (more numerous) against the provisions of the draft treaty. The NIA 
suggests that consultation occurred early. From my own experience working for the 
government I would suggest that the parties initially consulted were “IP rights-holders”, i.e. a 
one-sided set of the parties affected by copyright, trademarks, patents and other forms of 
“intellectual property”. 
I note that the Office of Best Practice Regulation has not required a regulation impact 
statement. I suggest they may be entirely oblivious to the range of parties who would be 
affected by this treaty and to the dangers of the expansionary term “intellectual property”. At 
a minimum there should be a detailed analysis of all the parties likely to be affected and 
whether they will benefit or have new costs imposed on them. This should include Australian 
consumers – a group not normally consulted by DFAT. This assessment of winners and 
losers should indicate, at least for major parties, whether they are Australian businesses, 
Australian-registered subsidiaries of overseas companies, or foreign companies.  
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Appendix 1    Issues in measuring counterfeit trade 
Actually measuring the extent of any counterfeiting problem is difficult, as is the case with 
estimating all illegal activities. The OECD report indicates that despite using a variety of 
sources the information they gathered falls far short of a robust overall estimate (OECD 
2008: 71). While the OECD report is the major source of global estimates for counterfeit 
trade, it is useful to supplement this with the study of counterfeit markets in the USA 
published by the GAO. This latter study includes reference to an interesting range of 
academic studies and also provides clearer detail on the biases in industry estimates of 
counterfeit products. Most interestingly it discredits three widely-cited estimates of costs of 
counterfeiting in the USA, indicating that the government agencies to which these estimates 
are attributed are unable to find the sources for such estimates (GAO 2010: 17-19).   
Some industry groups have published estimates of counterfeit trade but their methodologies 
are rarely clearly spelled out. Some, such as the Business Software Alliance, presume that 
volumes of goods sold in secondary markets equate with volumes lost in primary markets 
(GAO 2010: 21), a grossly untenable presumption. Industry lobby group estimates also 
ignore the benefits to legitimate producers of unauthorised use – in some fields, particularly 
software, this is considered to be a major means of developing brand loyalty and future 
upgrade to authorised versions (GAO 2010: 14-15).  
The OECD’s estimates of counterfeit goods are based on customs seizures. In an effort to 
include non-traded consumption of counterfeit goods the OECD reviews estimates from 
consumer surveys in several economies. In the USA in 2004-05 some 14 to 14% of 
respondents acquired downloaded products that might have been unauthorised, the main 
types of goods being music, movies, software and clothing. In the UK in 2005 34% advised 
they had knowingly purchased counterfeit goods (OECD 2008: 74). When considering 
counterfeit software and digital products, the OECD notes that high levels of use of 
counterfeit products are found in most developing economies (OECD 2008: 81). This would 
be consistent with the culture of copying which prevailed before TRIPS and was then an 
entirely lawful activity,14 and with the low income levels in these countries. These high 
reports of illegal activity indicate the extent to which consumers consider these laws are 
unbalanced and undeserving of serious attention. They confirm academic analyses that 
copyright systems have become unbalanced, with continual extensions legislated not in the 
public interest but because of the power of corporate lobbying.  
The OECD study is unusual in that many of the statements are not well-referenced, including 
the frequent allegations that there is a positive association between “intellectual property” and 
economic growth. Throughout the study there is a clear “pro-intellectual property” attitude, 
exemplified for example in the constant use of the loaded word “pirate” for unauthorised use 
of copyright and flowing through to listing only negative economic impacts on consumers. It 
is a matter of simple economics that consumers selecting a more reasonably priced product, 
and happy with its quality are substantially better off than if they are locked out of high-
price/high-quality markets. Under impact on innovation the innovative behaviour of copiers 
is not noted (despite this having been a major growth path in now rich countries and despite it 
also involving both process and product improvements and variations). Despite these biases 
the OECD estimates of “the problem” amount, at a maximum, to less than 2% of world trade.  
                                                 
14
 In low income countries it is quite difficult to explain to the low income workers involved in making 
unauthorized copies of, for example music, why their own government should provide monopolies for foreign 
parties which prevent them from making an income and fulfilling consumer demand that exists only at that 
price.  
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The GAO report is more even-handed in the evidence it presents, noting a range of positive 
economic effects flowing from markets in counterfeit goods. While major benefits clearly 
flow to consumers, thus releasing disposable income for expenditure on other goods and 
services, there can also be benefits to the “rights-holding” companies, including increased 
brand awareness and future sales.  
Both industry groups and US government agencies continue to refer to three major estimates 
of substantial counterfeit losses in the USA. The GAO approached the agencies allegedly 
responsible for these estimates and found none could be substantiated. One estimate is 
sourced to a 2002 FBI press release (losses of US$200-250b a year) but the FBI has no 
records of how this estimate was derived and is unable to corroborate the estimate (GAO 
2010: 17). A 2002 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) press release has also estimated 
counterfeit losses at US$200b a year and 780,000 jobs, but the CBP has now advised all staff 
not to use this estimate and advised the GAO it is of “uncertain origin” (GAO 2010: 18). The 
Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association advise an estimate of US$3b a year losses 
through counterfeit motor vehicle parts, attributed to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 
FTC officials advised the GAO they "were unable to locate any record or source of this 
estimate within its reports or archives, and officials could not recall the agency ever 
developing or using this estimate" (GAO 2010: 19). 
Both due to the intrinsic difficulties of measuring unlawful activities, and the challenges of 
providing aggregate estimates when the incidence of counterfeiting appears to vary 
considerably between product lines, countries and over time, estimates of the size of the 
problem need to be treated with caution. This is particularly the case where the estimates are 
provided by interested parties, without clear disclosure of the underlying methodology. From 
a national interest viewpoint consideration needs to be given to the positive as well as the 
negative impacts of this counterfeit trade. It should be noted that one major motivator for 
counterfeit trade is the expectation of high profits. A clear response by “rights-holders” could 
be to moderate their profit margins, which can be very substantial. This would reduce the 
incentive for unauthorised use. In the case of digital products one motivation for unauthorised 
use is to acquire products in formats which can be readily transferred between different 
equipment (Boldrin and Levine 2008: 35). Again “rights-holders” could reduce the 
motivation for such unauthorised use by reconsidering their business models and better 
meeting the needs of their customers.  
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Appendix 2    A note on Australia’s position on “intellectual property” 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations Australia was a “friend of intellectual property”. 
Quite how this policy position was determined is unclear. As these negotiations began in the 
mid/late 1980s, the IPAC review of the Australian patent system was very recent and should 
have informed public policy positions (IPAC 1984). That review made it clear that the patent 
system probably did nothing to increase Australian economic welfare (though there was no 
clear evidence that it reduced it). As a technology-importing nation, simple back-of-the-
envelope calculations show that it would be to Australia’s economic advantage to grant 
legislated copyright and patent monopolies only for limited periods and only for genuinely 
creative or innovative things. As to trademarks, the negative impact on domestic policy 
freedom of agreeing to TRIPS is evident in the use of TRIPS by tobacco companies to 
challenge the Australian government’s sovereign right to protect the health of Australians. 
Since the WTO package came into force in 1995, the USA has initiated a series of TRIPS+ 
treaties all of which involve much higher “intellectual property” provisions than agreed in 
TRIPS. The breadth of this strategy has been demonstrated by Drahos (2001), and from 
Australia’s perspective this culminated in the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement 
(AUSFTA), which was and remains controversial (see e.g. Dee 2005; Weiss, Thurbon and 
Mathews 2004). Particular criticism was directed at the “intellectual property” provisions, 
specifically the unwarranted extension of copyright life, and the provisions bringing 
Australia’s domestic health arrangements (the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme) within the 
ambit of the influence of foreign patent holders.  
Australia has followed the lead of the US and has also initiated a series of regional bilateral 
agreements, most of which follow the template designed by the US to meet US conditions. 
There appears to have been no realisation that these terms are designed to meet the needs of a 
very large technology exporting nation. They are inappropriate for a much smaller economy, 
such as Australia, which is a net technology importing nation producing with a net deficit on 
the royalties account.15  
In struggling to understand why Australia ever agreed to sign the AUSFTA, which does not 
meet the standard of a clear net economic benefit for Australia, one is forced to conclude that 
non-economic reasons dominate, or that our trade negotiators have a poor grasp of economic 
reality. It would also appear from the frequent inclusion of matters that do not properly 
belong in free trade negotiations (as they are designed to limit market competition), that our 
trade negotiators are poorly informed about the net economic impact of stronger “intellectual 
property” provisions on the Australian economy. The large majority of patents (in excess of 
90%) and copyrights enforced in Australia belong to offshore entities and the net balance in 
payments is in favour of overseas countries.  
The Productivity Commission’s (PC) recent review of Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements included specific consideration of the inclusion of “intellectual property” 
provisions in trade treaties, including specific attention to the issue of treaties to strengthen 
enforcement of such provisions (Productivity Commission 2010: 257-64). The PC noted that 
most benefits from any enforcement treaty would accrue to third parties not to Australians or 
Australian entities. It is clear from DFAT’s submission on the PC’s draft report that DFAT 
focuses particularly on the interests of those narrow sections of Australian business which 
                                                 
15
 While it appears the US insistence on ever-higher “intellectual property” standards provides major inflows of 
royalty revenue to the USA to offset the deficit on the US current account, no such argument applies with 
respect to Australia. 
 13
benefit from stronger “intellectual property”. The Commission rightly took short shrift with 
this sectional view and referred to its obligations under its Act to consider the benefits and 
costs to the whole Australian community. It is unfortunate that DFAT does not seem to take 
such a public interest approach to its trade negotiations. Nonetheless, the Gillard Government 
agreed with eight of the PC’s ten recommendations in full and with the other two in part.16   
DFAT’s pro-“intellectual property” view is also clear from the NIA on ACTA.17 They 
suggest that the alleged problem of counterfeit and unauthorised goods is significant and 
growing. Yet the OECD analysis suggests that this is probably less than 2% of world trade, 
and that growth in counterfeiting is due to greater growth in goods susceptible to 
counterfeiting rather than to any increase in the propensity to counterfeit. The comment on 
Australian “intellectual property” holders does not note that the net outflow of royalty 
payments is substantially larger than copyright foreign exchange earnings. It does not note 
that the major benefits of this treaty accrue to foreign entities not to Australians. The analysis 
does not comment on how this proposed treaty fits within the government’s response to the 
Productivity Commission Report. That response agreed that participation in any bilateral or 
regional trade agreement should only occur on the basis of a demonstrated significant net 
economic benefit. At no time during the ACTA negotiations, including in the NIA, is there 
any robust economic analysis demonstrating the winners, losers and net economic benefit. 
Effectively when it comes to “intellectual property” DFAT seems unaware of the pros and 
cons of different forms of legislated monopolies and how these intersect with Australia’s 
economic structure.  
 
                                                 
16
 Attachment to Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement, April 2011, available at 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trading-our-way-to-more-jobs-and-prosperity.pdf 
17
 As noted above I have assumed that the NIA was drafted by DFAT. Authorship is not disclosed.  
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